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Abstract—This paper presents Xprova, an open-source formal
verification tool for multi-clock designs. Xprova is a model
checker that can discover property violations caused by the in-
correct implementation of clock domain crossing circuits. Unlike
existing clock domain crossing verification tools, Xprova does not
rely on structural or functional analysis to detect deviations from
standard design practices. Instead, it transforms the input circuit
to model the onset and propagation of metastability digitally,
then conducts a state space exploration to search for property
violations. This approach is intrinsically capable of identifying
several well-known clock domain crossing problems including
missing synchronizers, path reconvergence issues and glitches.
It also improves debuggability by generating counter-example
waveforms showing the onset and mechanics of metastability-
induced design failures. We discuss the features, underlying
methodology and implementation of the tool then present use
cases to compare it to commercial alternatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most modern digital systems contain tens to hundreds
of voltage and frequency domains, some massively-parallel
architectures even thousands. Transferring signals between
these domains is known as Clock Domain Crossing (CDC) and
is a well-recognized thorny design area. This is because several
assumptions that are often taken for granted in synchronous
logic do not apply at clock domain boundaries. Most notably,
asynchronous signal transitions cannot be constrained relative
to their receiving clocks. Consequently, these transitions can
violate the setup-hold time constraints of recipient flip-flops
and drive them into metastable states. The metastable flip-
flops can then latch non-deterministic values and propagate
timing violations further, to their own destinations, resulting
in various types of failures. To avoid such caveats, clock
boundary logic must be carefully designed. In practice, this
involves implementing a stereotypical design pattern that is
correct by construction, such as synchronization.
Designing correct clock boundary logic is difficult because
conventional EDA tools have limited support for modeling
timing violations, metastability and their effects in digital
simulation. Digital tools often model flip-flops as idealized
storage elements with discrete binary values, an abstraction
that does not capture the anomalous behavior of metastable
flip-flops and its consequences [1]. Multi-clock designs may
therefore show no issues when simulated and verified using
conventional tools, but still fail once implemented in silicon.
This work was supported by EPSRC grant EP/N031768/1 (project POETS).
This paper presents Xprova,1 a model checker that attempts
to address clock boundary verification at a fundamental level.
Similar to other model checkers, Xprova explores the state
space of an input design to either verify or disprove functi-
onal assertions that describe the design’s intended behavior.
However, it can also model and simulate the onset, propaga-
tion and effects of metastable states in synchronous circuits,
using the methodology presented in [2]. It can therefore
discover property violations caused by the incorrect handling
of metastability and other timing hazards at clock domain
boundaries. This approach is fundamentally different from the
structural and functional analysis techniques used by other
CDC verification tools. In comparison, Xprova offers the
following advantages:
(1) Zero configuration: it is agnostic to how signals are
transferred between clock domains and does not require
information about what synchronization scheme, hand-
shaking mechanism or other design patterns are used;
(2) Fewer false positives: it reports fewer false positives
because it does not rely on structural and functional rules-
of-thumb that have plenty of exceptions in practice;
(3) Generality: it can verify non-stereotypical designs, inclu-
ding those that violate standard practices [3];
(4) Debuggability: when a property violation is discovered,
it generates a counter-example showing the issue in
simulation waveforms, making it easier for the designer
to understand and debug the root cause;
(5) No built-in knowledge: it is intrinsically capable of re-
cognizing several well-known clock boundary issues in-
cluding missing synchronizers, path reconvergence, data
incoherency and crossover path glitches, without built-in
assumptions about what constitutes a correct design.
Xprova is an open-source tool, developed in Java and
available under the MIT license. It supports the Verilog 2001
standard and a property language similar to SystemVerilog
Assertions (SVA). This paper presents the tool and compares
it with commercial alternatives. Section II provides necessary
background on existing CDC verification approaches while
Section III discusses the features and implementation details
of the tool. Section IV concludes by presenting two use cases.
1Available on https://github.com/xprova
Figure 1. Missing synchronizer: an unsynchronized crossover signal req is
used to enable a data register R.
II. BACKGROUND
The growth in the number of on-chip clock domains du-
ring the past decade lead to the development of specialized
EDA tools to help designers avoid metastability and other
clock boundary design caveats. Today, many such tools exist
including Questa CDC by Mentor Graphics, SpyGlass CDC
by Synopsys and Conformal CDC by Cadence. These tools
differ in features but share a common underlying scheme; they
check designs against lists of pre-programmed rules and design
patterns and issue warnings when deviations from standard
practices are detected. This section reviews this approach
with the aim of establishing a baseline for comparison with
metastability simulation in Xprova.
A. Structural Analysis
Clock boundary issues can often be identified by analyzing
the circuit structure alone. Consider, for example, the circuit in
Figure 1. Here, a sender sets up a value on data and asserts
req to initiate a handshake. On the receiver’s side, req is
used as an enable signal to latch data in a local register R.
This is a well-recognized problematic implementation; the
unbounded arrival time of req means that different bits of
R may become metastable if req arrives too close to the
clock edge. When this happens, some bits of R may succeed
to capture the respective data bits while others retain their
old values, effectively corrupting the stored value. This can
be prevented by piping req through a flip-flop chain (i.e.
a synchronizer) before using it to latch data. In principle,
this and similar cases can be recognized automatically by
an EDA tool that analyzes the structure of the circuit and
looks for crossover signal buses that are not multiplexed by
an accompanying pipelined (control) signal.
In practice, it is difficult to tell from circuit structure alone
if the data is being synchronized correctly, or if the lack of
synchronization is a problem in the first place. The circuit
in Figure 1, for example, can function correctly without
a synchronizer if data and req were part of a quasi-stable
configuration word that is initialized during system startup
and remains static at runtime. In fact, the design may still
be correct even if data bits were to change at runtime, so
long as data changes by a single-bit and the output of R
is subsequently synchronized (a common design pattern in
Figure 2. Path reconvergence: simultaneous changes in a and b (at clk1) may
be copied to a′ and b′ in different cycles (of clk2).
asynchronous FIFOs with Gray-coded read and write pointers).
Structural analysis tools prefer to err on the safe side and
therefore rely on conservative rules of thumb to make sure
no issues go undetected. As a result, more correct circuits are
suspected and get marked for the attention of the designer as
containing potential issues. The toll on verification time can
be hefty if one considers that applying structural analysis to
a commercial SoC can generate 100s of thousands of clock
boundary warnings, 90% of which are false positives due to
tool misconfiguration and non-standard design cases [4].
B. Functional Analysis
Taking the functional properties of the design into account
can help resolve ambiguities concerning whether certain clock
boundary circuit structures pose an actual problem or not.
Tools use functional analysis to detect “path reconvergence”
issues for instance, a scenario illustrated in Figure 2. Here,
two bits a and b are synchronized independently and used to
compute y = a′ + b′, (where a′ and b′ are the synchronized
copies). As is the case with missing synchronizers, this too is
a non-standard design pattern with possibly problematic con-
sequences. Although a and b are both synchronized, synchro-
nizers have non-deterministic latencies and so simultaneous
changes in a and b may be copied to a′ and b′ in different
receiver clock cycles, an issue referred to as data incoherence.
Has this been taken into consideration when designing the
circuit or did the designer incorrectly assume that a′ = b′?
Again, most tool prefer to err on the safe side and therefore
issue a warning if combinational paths from a′ and b′ to
a single destination flip-flop can be sensitized at the same time
(a condition that is satisfied in our example). The intuition
behind this assumption is that path sensitization indicates that
both operands are “in use” at the same time and so one
cannot rule out the possibility that their incoherence may cause
a problem. This of course is another conservative generaliza-
tion with its own exceptions. Just because a and b are used
simultaneously does not imply that the design will necessarily
fail. For example, y itself may be logically masked in all the
cases where a and b transition simultaneously. In general, it
is difficult to tell whether data incoherence represents a true
issue without considering the design’s specification. Functional
analysis can therefore aid in resolving certain ambiguities but
does not eliminate them completely.
Figure 3. An example of the circuit transformation applied by Xprova. First, flip-flops are replaced with model cells that communicate timing violation
information using additional pins (T, V and M). Copies of combinational paths are then inserted to model the propagation of timing violations between flip-flops
and logical masking by local (stable) signals.
III. FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents Xprova and discusses some of its
features and implementation details. We compare the met-
hodology used by the tool against structural and functional
verification in Section IV, using concrete circuit examples.
A. Overview
Xprova is a Verilog model checker that can prove/disprove
assertions expressed in an SVA-like property language. It has
a command line interface and can be used either interactively
or by calling script files. The following script demonstrates
the basic steps in a typical verification run:
# load user cell library
library load gates90nm.v
# load metastable flip-flop models (internal library)
library load lib/xprova.v
# load design
read -b examples/fifo/fifo.v
# define assumptions and assertions
assume full |=> ~write
assume empty |=> ~read
assert ~(empty & full)
assert write |=> ~empty
assert read |=> ~full
# attempt prove
prove
Similar to other model checkers, assumptions specify re-
gions of the state space that are of interest while assertions
express how the design is intended to behave. The tool
performs an exhaustive state space exploration in the search
for states where all assumptions hold but an assertion does
not. If no such states are found, the tool indicates that the
assertion was proven. Otherwise, it prints a counter-example
showing a sequence of inputs that advances the design from
reset to a state where the assertion is violated.
Xprova’s core functionality is provided by a circuit transfor-
mation, described next, that augments the input design before
passing it to the internal model checker. The transformation
enables the circuit to simulate metastability effects digitally.
B. Modeling Metastability
The simulation of metastability effects is performed auto-
matically and in a manner that is transparent to the user. The
tool recognizes multi-clock designs and modifies them by:
(1) replacing flip-flops with model cells that can simulate
setup/hold time violations, non-deterministic outputs and
clk-to-q delay violations, and
(2) adding additional combinational circuit elements to mo-
del the transfer of metastability between flip-flops.
We discuss this transformation using the circuit in Figure 3
as a working example while referring readers to [2] for
a thorough discussion on the methodology. The purpose of
the transformation is to enable flip-flops to communicate
information about timing violations and thus model the onset,
propagation and effects of metastability. This is done using
the additional signals:
(1) T: output transition,
(2) V: setup-hold time violation, and
(3) M: metastable output.
The behavior of the transformed circuit can be explained as
follows. When the value stored in a changes, its T output is as-
serted to indicate an output transition. On the first subsequent
edge of clk2, b’s V input is asserted, indicating that b’s setup-
hold time conditions have been violated. b then asserts it’s
M output to indicate that it is metastable and “propagates” its
metastable state to d, with whom it shares an M to V connection.
The connection between b and c is slightly more complex
due to the presence of combinational logic (gate g1). Here, we
wish to model the logical masking of b’s metastable state by
the (stable) signal e. We do this by first creating a copy of g1
(g1c) then passing to it an unknown bit (X) as b’s active state.
If the output of g1c is X then the combinational path from b
to c is sensitized and metastability can propagate between the
two. On the other hand, if the output of g1c is either 0 or 1
then the metastable output of b has been masked. Since the
signals T, V and M are used to test logical masking between
flip-flops, they all, in fact, use an “active-X” encoding where X
represents an active state while 0/1 represent an inactive state.
In reality, of course, metastable states do not rise and pro-
pagate between vulnerable flip-flops on each cycle. To model
the non-deterministic properties of metastability, each model
flip-flop has two internal signals r1 and r2 that determine (1)
whether an asserted V causes metastability and (2) the value
of Q if the flip-flop becomes metastable. Xprova extracts all r1
and r2 signals as top-level inputs to the design and includes
them in its state space exploration model. It can therefore
enumerate all possible sequences of metastability onset and
propagation for a given design. This approach exploits the
power of formal verification to discover property violations
resulting from otherwise-obscure chains of metastable events.
C. Property Language
Xprova’s property language will feel familiar to users
of SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA) and Property Synthesis
Language (PSL). The following script shows some supported
operators and built-in functions:
# basic logical operators:
assert w = (x & y) | ~(z ^ y)
# relational operators:
assert (data == v1) & (data != v2)
assert (data > v1) & (data < v2)
assert (data >= v1) & (data <= v2)
# implication:
assert x |-> y
assert x |=> y
# (x implies y on the same/following cycle)
# signal level changes:
assert $rose(x) | $fell(y) | $stable(z) | $changed(w)
# signal level history:
assert $always(x) | $never(y)
# bit reduction:
assert $any(x) | $all(y)
# past and future value referencing:
assert (x == @2 y) & (x == #3 z)
# (x equals y two cycles before, and z three cycles after)
# sequences:
assert x ## y ## z
# (x followed by y and z, each on a consecutive cycle)
Xprova can also verify liveness assertions, expressed using
the $eventually built-in function:
# liveness assertion:
assert $eventually(trigger, expr)
# (once trigger is true, expr must become true, eventually)
D. Verification Flow
The verification flow using Xprova is illustrated in Figure 4.
The tool first augments the input design by substituting
flip-flops with model cells and inserting combinational path
duplicates, as described in Section III-B. Property circuits
are then synthesized and included in the netlist. Xprova
subsequently generates a model of the circuit (in either C++
Figure 4. Typical verification flow using Xprova (white boxes are inputs/out-
puts and gray boxes are processing steps).
or Java, based on user’s choice), consisting of a cycle-based
simulator and a state space exploration function. The model
is compiled, executed and, upon termination, prints the status
of each assertion, either pass (proven) or fail (disproven). For
each disproven assertion, Xprova generates a counter-example
waveform in VCD format. Counter-examples are always the
shortest possible for safety (i.e. non-liveness) assertions, and
include the T, V and M signals of the implicated flip-flops to
help users trace the cause and mechanics of the violation.
Xprova can export the augmented netlist as a Verilog
file, giving users the freedom to verify it using external
formal verification tools. This option is provided because the
metastability-modeling feature provided by the tool is not tied
to exhaustive state space exploration as a formal verification
technique. Users may therefore export their augmented de-
signs and verify them using bounded-model checkers, theorem
provers or other formal techniques. External verification tools
must support three-valued logic, however, since unknown bits
are used by the augmented circuit to model the propagation
of timing violations between flip-flops.
In addition to external formal verification tools, Xprova
integrates with several free and open-source EDA tools. It can
invoke yosys [5] behind the scenes to synthesize behavioral
designs prior to verification, optionally during the loading
step (using the switch -b of the read command).2 Counter-
examples can be opened automatically in gtkwave [6] and
various netlist representations can be exported as graphs in
DOT format.
2Many clock boundary issues exist at the netlist abstraction level and can be
verified only once the behavioral design has been synthesized (Section IV-B
presents an example of an issue introduced during synthesis). Xprova supports
loading behavioral designs but users should be aware that, for behavioral
designs, verification results will apply to the netlists synthesized by yosys
during the loading step (which can be exported using the write command).
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clk
send
valid
din 0x00 0x3A
data 0x00 0x3A
dout 0x00 0x32
V(R)[3]
T(k3)
Figure 5. (Left) A circuit to transfer data items between clock domains, missing a synchronizer on the receiver side. (Right) Counter-example generated by
Xprova, showing an assertion violation caused by the missing synchronizer (mismatch between sent and received data items).
IV. EXAMPLES
This section presents examples of multi-clock circuits in
which errors have been made when designing clock interface
logic. We demonstrate the use of Xprova by attempting to
prove certain assertions describing each design and debugging
the resulting counter-examples.
A. Example 1: Missing Synchronizer
In the first example (Figure 5), a circuit is provided to
transfer data items across a clock domain boundary. At the
interface level, the circuit is intended to operate as follows:
(1) the sender sets up din then asserts send, (2) valid is then
asserted when dout contains a new data item and (3) send
must be kept high during the transfer, until done goes low.
Internally, the circuit relies on a four-way handshake and
uses a logic gate g1 to enable the receiving register R2
when req goes high. This transfer mechanism would operate
correctly if not for the absence of a synchronizer at the
receiver’s side (as shown in Figure 5, req is used directly to
enable R2 without being piped through a synchronizer chain).
We assume that this issue is not apparent at a first glance and
proceed to verify the circuit by describing its behavior using
the following Xprova properties:
# Assumption 1:
assume (req & !done) |-> send
# Assertion 1:
assert valid |-> ($when($rose(send), din) == dout)
where Assumption 1 constrains the environment such that
send remains high during a transfer and Assertion 1 states
that the sent and received data items are equal.3 Attempting
to prove this specification using Xprova results in a fail status
assigned to Assertion 1 and generates the counter-example
shown in Figure 5.
At the moment it is unclear whether the violation is caused
by a typical (synchronous) design issue or a clock boundary
3To define what the sent item was, we use the $when() built-in function
to sample din when send went high.
problem. However, a quick look at the counter-example makes
it immediately obvious that it is the latter. When searching for
property violations, Xprova examines metastability-free state
space regions first. If no violations are found, the tool proceeds
to explore other possibilities, always starting with the simplest
scenarios of metastability onset and propagation. Therefore,
the presence of a metastable event (a propagating sequence of
timing violations) in the counter-example means that this event
has explicitly caused the violation. In our counter-example,
the T pin of k3 and V pin of R2[3] are in an active state in
cycle 3 and are therefore implicated in causing the violation
(recall that these pins use active-X encoding). Examining the
waveform, it appears that the data item 0x3A was received as
0x32 and that the mismatch occurred when data was latched
by R2 during cycle 3. Given that V pin of R2[3] is active
on the same cycle, it is now apparent that the setup/hold
time conditions of flip-flop R2[3] were violated, causing the
fourth bit of the data item to be latched incorrectly (0 instead
of 1) in cycle 3. The setup/hold time violation is caused by
the transition of k3 during the same cycle and is therefore
an indication that req is used, without synchronization, as a
combinational input to R2.
Before moving on, it is worth comparing the verification
flow above with structural/functional analysis. Structural ana-
lysis is very reliable at identifying missing synchronizers
and would generate a warning when inspecting this circuit.
However, it will leave it to the designer to understand the
circuit and confirm whether the warning is indicative of an
actual issue. As discussed in Section II, this process is costly
in terms of verification time since the majority of structural
warnings are actually false positives. Using Xprova, on the
other hand, we were able to confirm the existence of an error
with minimal investment in verification time: understanding
the internal behavior of the design was not required until
the presence of an error has been confirmed. The tool also
generated the shortest sequence of inputs and metastable
events to reproduce the error and has therefore made it easier
to understand and debug the violation.
clk
sel
opt1
opt2
y
V(y)
n3c
T(b)
Figure 6. (Left) Circuit with a glitch hazard. (Right) counter-example generated by Xprova showing a property violation caused by the glitch.
B. Example 2: Glitches
For the second example, we consider the circuit in Figure 6,
an adaptation of a circuit published in [7]. The circuit is built
around a simple multiplexer with an unusual implementation
detail: the output of one of its logic gates (g3) represents
an expression that evaluates to 0 in all cases (b ∧ ¬b).
Gate g3 is therefore redundant and can be removed while
converting g4 into a two-input OR gate. Combinational logic
“artifacts” such as these are sometimes created by synthesis
engines as a result of applying certain optimizations. Apart
from making the circuit more efficient (usually in ways that are
obvious to the synthesis engine alone), synthesis artifacts do
not change the Boolean expression represented by the circuit
and are therefore harmless in synchronous logic. In this circuit,
however, b belongs to a different clock domain and propa-
gating it through different combinational paths can introduce
a glitch. The glitch occurs when b transitions; if the paths
from b to the inputs of g3 have different delays then a logic
high state may appear temporarily on n3 and propagate to n4
just by the time it is sampled by y. Interestingly, this glitch
may introduce an error even when the “relevant” circuit parts
are synchronous. For example, when s = 1 it is intuitive to
think of the multiplexer as blocking the asynchronous bit b
and selecting the (stable) synchronous bit a. This, however, is
not the case. Even when s = 1, transitions of b may cause
temporary glitches at the input of y.
As before we will ignore our knowledge of the circuit’s
issues for the purpose of illustration.4 We assume that the
circuit is provided as a black box, alongside an intended
specification that includes the property:
# Assertion 1:
assert sel |=> (out == @2 opt1)
where the operator @2 samples the operand 2 cycles earlier.
After running Xprova on this circuit, Assertion 1 is given
a fail status and the counter-example in Figure 6 is generated.
The counter-example shows a case where sel was high but
4The reader may notice that the circuit is also missing a synchronizer.
y did not copy opt1 after two cycles, a contradiction of
Assertion 1. As with Example 1, the counter-example includes
few metastability modeling nets in an active state and so we
can tell that the violation is caused by a metastable event.
Tracing back from out, the setup/hold time conditions of y
were violated on cycle 3 (V(y) = X) and this was caused by a
metastable state propagating through n3 (its duplicate net n3c
is X) and originating from a transition of b (since T(b) = X).
This is sufficient to tell what is wrong with this circuit; there is
a combinational path b→ y that is permitting b’s transitions to
arrive at y’s input when sel is high. The hazard can be avoided
by changing the multiplexer implementation, or better yet by
adding a synchronizer at b’s output. These solutions can be
verified by re-running Xprova after making the changes and
checking that Assertion 1 receives a pass status.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented Xprova, a formal verification tool capable
of identifying property violations caused by clock domain
boundary issues. The tool offers better observability and
debuggability compared to commercial alternatives based on
structural and functional analysis.
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